This article examines two criteria for the existence of mental states, namely, Descartes and Turing’s. While the former holds that machines can’t think in principle, the latter is an advocate of machine intelligence. Despite this, both views seem to be similar in relation to how mental states are judged to exist. Even though this is expected from Descartes’ rationalism, it seems surprising in Turing’s functionalism. Indeed, no interpreter of the Imitation Game acknowledges that the interrogators can’t be replaced and, further, that such interrogators apply an internist criterion to judge whether they are in presence of a mind or a machine. This issue, which involves an internist approach to the mind, makes the Turing Test difficult for a machine. For this reason, I conclude that Turing’s test is not only unable to replace the question: can a machine think? In addition, it dramatically shifts the focus of the debate onto the philosophy of mind.
Gonzalez, R. (2016). Two criteria for the existence of mental states: Descartes and Turing. Cinta De Moebio. Revista De Epistemología De Ciencias Sociales, (56). Retrieved from https://actascoloquiogiannini.uchile.cl/index.php/CDM/article/view/41869
